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A number of developments which occurred since the 1990s in Western 
Europe suggest that those parliamentary governments traditionally referred to 
as “consociational” have been moving towards “majoritarianism”: this has been 
the case in all four countries which have long been regarded as embodying this 
form of government, together with Switzerland –which does not have a 
parliamentary government, however–. The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and 
Italy. In rapid succession, from the middle of the 1990s, these four countries 
have come to be ruled by governments which have eschewed the kind of 
“power-sharing” arrangements which characterised “consociationalism” and 
have moved towards a “government and opposition” form of rule more 
characteristic of the majoritarian model. Meanwhile, but in a less dramatic 
fashion, changes which are occurring in some of the “majoritarian countries” 
suggest that there may be some “softening” of “majoritarianism” where it has 
traditionally prevailed. 
It is difficult to interpret these movements in the context of the only 
framework which has been elaborated to distinguish between types of 
parliamentary governments, that of Lijphart. This is de pite the fact that that 
framework opened up in a pioneering manner a line of analysis on these 
governments. Perhaps the main reason is that the way the framework is 
structured does not allow for a mechanism to register dynamics. This is also 
because the distinction is based on the opposition between “majoritarianism” 
and “consensus democracy”, a distinction which leads to a contrast, not to 
dimensions. Moreover, there is no precise definition of the two contrasting 
types, while the criteria used to categorise these types are a series of 
dichotomised variables designed to account for the fact that a particular system 
of government falls within one or the other of the two types. These 
categorisations are thus in the nature of “independent variables” while the type 
of parliamentary government is the dependent variable. 
Given that some problems arise about the way the two broad types of 
systems are characterised, it is important first to revisit Lijphart's model in order 
to see where it might have to be somewhat modified in order to be better 
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adjusted to the conditions prevailing at least in Western Europe. Only then will 
it become possible to examine the extent to which Western European 
parliamentary systems appear to be all moving towards what might be 
described as a more “cooperative” form of majoritarian government. 
I 
Three aspects of the distinction between “majoritarian” and “consensus” 
governments given by Lijphart need to be examined closely. First, the two 
types must be more precisely defined. Second, there should not be a contrast 
between two types, but there should be dimensions and indeed two 
dimensions. Third, there is a need to have a further look at some of the 
variables used to determine the position occupied by a given parliamentary 
government as well as for a tightening of the operationalisation of these 
variables. 
Searching for Definitions of the Lijphart Types of 
“Majoritarian” and “Consensus” Parliamentary Governments 
Lijphart's undertaking aims at covering, especially in the 1984 volume, 
Democracies, but to a large extent also in the 1999 work, Patterns of 
Democracy, all types of democratic governments: as a matter of fact, however, 
these works have concentrated on types of parliamentary systems: and 
especially among types of parliamentary systems in Western Europe. 14 of the 
21 country-cases examined in 1984 were Western European parliamentary 
systems; in 1999, these still constituted 18 of the 36 country- ases, the bulk of 
the others (13) being parliamentary governments outside Western Europe, 
principally in the Commonwealth; only four presidential systems and 
Switzerland are non-parliamentary. It is thus permissible to concentrate the 
attention here on the applicability of the findings to parliamentary systems and 
essentially to Western European parliamentary systems. Indeed, the model 
has had the decisive impact of moving analyses away from the rather 
simplistic notion that parliamentary governments had all to be of the 
“Westminster” type if they were to function effectively. As this paper a ms at 
examining changes which have been taking place among Western European 
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governments in the 1990s and in the early part of the twenty-first century, it 
confines itself to an examination of Lijphart's model in the context of these 
governments –Switzerland being naturally excluded from that analysisl, since it 
is not of the parliamentary type. 
Somewhat surprisingly, no precise definition of “majoritarian” and 
“consensus” government is given by Lijphart in either volume. The only 
reference to what might constitute a definition is provided at the beginning of 
Chapters 2 (at p. 21 in the 1984 earlier volume on Democracies which was 
primarily devoted to parliamentary governments) or 3 (at p. 31 in the 1999 
volume on Patterns of Democracy), on "The Consensus Model of Democracy". 
In what is in reality merely a “presentation” of the two types, it is stated that 
"[t]he majoritarian interpretation of the basic definition of democracy is that it 
means ‘government by the majority of the people’" (1984, 21 and 1999, 31). 
This is scarcely a definition, would it only be because the “majority” which is 
relevant in the context of representative government is the majority in 
parliament (and typically in the lower chamber only if there are two chambers): 
such a majority does not necessarily coincide –indeed in practice rarely 
coincides– with a majority of the people and even of the voters, given the 
vagaries of electoral systems. 
Conversely, it is not stated either what “consensus” precisely refers to. 
The expression “consensus” presumably should not be taken literally, as it is 
unlikely to entail that all be represented in the government and agree with what 
that government does. There has to be a “cut-off point” somewhere. While 
never discussing what “consensus” precisely entails, Lijphart prefers it to the 
term consociational which he previously used, in part because it is "shorter –
and easier to pronounce–" (1984, xiv), but more seriously for two reasons. One 
is that the majoritarian system is taken as the point of departure, not th  
“consociational” system, as had been the case in previous works: it is difficult to 
see why this change of standpoint makes the “other” system “consensual” 
rather than “consociational”. The other reason is that the “variables” now being 
adopted to account for the two models are "not coincident" with those 
previously used to define consociationalism: yet this might simply mean that 
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these new variables account better for consociationalism than the previous 
ones. 
Lijphart is indeed right, as we shall see, to use the term “consensus” rather 
than the term “consociational” to refer to the two types which he aims at 
describing, although he is not right to have jettisoned the term consociational 
altogether: we shall see that this term does indeed help to refer a sub-set 
which needs to be considered. Yet there remains a major problem if one 
adopts Lijphart's terminology: we need to know what precise meaning is given 
to the word “consensus” in the context of the activities of a government. Is it 
simply that one is referring to governments which have a larger base than a 
“bare majority”? It manifestly means something “more” in Lijphart's 
interpretation since he quotes Arthur Lewis who speaks of "all who are affected 
...(having) the chance to participate in making (the) decision" (31). Lijphart 
indicates later that the idea is to “include” rather than “exclude” (33). Yet 
exactly how many should be included or what should the process of decision-
making be to warrant stating that a particular government operatesn a 
“consensus” basis is not clarified.  
An attempt was made by Sergio Fabbrini, in his work Quale democrazia? 
(Rome: Laterza, 1994) to remedy to some extent to this lack of definition. The 
expressions used are not the same as Lijphart's: Fabbrini refers to “competitive 
democracies” instead of majoritarianism' and to “consociational democracies” 
instead of “consensus governments” but he does aim at covering the same 
distinction as Lijphart's. "Competitive democracies are those which tend to 
stress the opposition between alternative party options..... [consociative 
democracies are those] which tend to stress the agreement among the main 
party options" (1994, 15- 6) (emphasis in the text; my translation). The aim in 
one case is to “exclude”, says the author w  uses there the same formulas as 
Lijphart, while in the other it is to “include” (ibid.). 
One might tighten the definition a little and return to using Lijphart's 
expressions by stating the following. A majoritarian system of government is 
one in which democracy is conceived in terms of a conflict between “blocs”, 
typically of relatively equal size, the assumption being that there will be 
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alternance between these blocs over time. It is worth noting that such a system 
stresses the autonomy of politics with respect to the society in general. A 
consensus-type system of government is one in which democracy is conceived 
in terms of wide agreements among the political parties, these being regarded 
as representing the various social forces in the society. The word “consensus” 
is kept, but it is qualified by the reference to “wide” agreements: it is not posited 
that everyone has to be (above all ostensibly) in accord with the line which is 
adopted, as this is almost never the case, when one is referring to the activities
of a whole government, although this may occur for particular decisions. 
The Need for a Two-Dimensional Approach 
Lijphart is absolutely clear that few countries, if any, fall in one or the other 
of the two types, majoritarian and consensus. He notes this point from the start. 
At the outset of the Chapter on the majoritarian model, he states that Britain 
and New Zealand are the “prototypes” (1999, 10) and early in the Chapter on 
the “consensus” model, he states that the "examples used to illustrate" that 
model are Switzerland (not a parliamentary system), Belgium and the 
European Union (not a parliamentary system and indeed more akin to the 
Swiss system). The two models have therefore to be regarded as “ideal-types” 
but also as extreme positions in a continuum. 
The countries which constitute “intermediate cases” are therefore very 
important: they constitute the large majority. Yet it is frankly impossible to 
accommodate these cases unless there is indeed a “continuum” along which 
these cases can be distributed. The problem is that the distinction between 
“majoritarian” and “consensus” parliamentary government leads to a dimension 
only if the word “consensus” is regarded as meaning “very large majority”. Such 
a dimension would identify types of “power-sharing” ranging from “bare 
majority” to “unanimity”. A difficulty would still remain in relation to “minority 
governments” of which there are, as we know, a large number (one sixth of the 
total for Western Europe, as indicated by Lijphart (1999, 98)): this type of 
occurrence is too frequent to be dismissed as being “exceptional”; but one has 
then to explain how parliamentary governments can be of a minority character, 
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minority meaning operationally that the parties represented in the government 
do not have amajority of seats in parliament. 
Yet the “power-sharing” dimension which we have just identified not only 
does not explain why minority governments exist: it does not correspond either 
to the idea of “inclusion” which Lijphart considers to be a key aspect of the type 
of parliamentary government which he refers to as “consensual”. “Inclusion” 
means that as many as possible are involved in the process of decision-
making: it is distinct from “power-sha ing” as it refers to the extent to which the 
views of “others” are listened to, whether these “others” share power or not. 
This is why such a concept can help to cope with minority governments. If such 
governments exist, that is to say if there are parliamentary governments in 
which the parties represented in the government do not have the majority in 
parliament, this must be because an agreement exists between the parties in 
the government and some of the parties which are not in the government. The 
agreement may be temporary and precarious or well-structured and long-
lasting: but it has in any case to integrate in some fashion segments of the 
legislature which otherwise would not support the government. This may not 
result in “consensus” in the strong sense of the word; but it does constitute a 
move going beyond “pure” majoritarian rule, a move which might be minuscule 
if the support needed is tiny or be very large if the support needed is 
substantial. 
In this way, one comes to be concerned with something different from 
“power-sharing”: one comes to be concerned with the way the government 
behaves in relation to bodies other than itself. If one then enlarges the notion 
and considers the problem in terms of “inclusion”, as the word “consensus” 
invites us to do, what one comes to be concerned with is no longer just with
those parties represented in the government, but also with the relationship 
between the government and the rest of the political public. One is concerned 
with a mode of behaviour and not only with the proportion of those who are in 
government. This mode of behaviour can be “adversarial”: it can simply ignore 
the others and state that what the government wants has to be the law; but it 
can be “cooperative” and try at least to find out whether some accord can be 
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found. It can also occupy one of an infinite number of positions between these 
two extremes, for instance if the government attempts, but only up to a point, 
to listen to others and take the comments into account. It is therefore right to 
refer to that activity as aiming towards “consensus”. Overall, this means that, 
alongside the “power-sharing” dimension, there is a “mode of behaviour” 
dimension and it is that second dimension which is concerned with the question 
of “consensus”. 
Only if one recognises that two dimensions are involved can one resolve 
the problem posed by the contrast between “majoritarianism” and “consensus” 
government. For, if there is only one dimension, “consensus” has to be 
regarded as meaning “large majority”: one can then accommodate the many 
cases of parliamentary governments which are not of one type or the other 
along that dimension, but it is a vast exaggeration to refer to “consensus” as 
the “spirit” of “inclusion” is not taken into account. Or one sticks to the idea of 
“consensus” meaning really “consensus” –at any rate meaning real attempts at 
building consensus–, but one is then either confronted with a contrast between 
two incompatible types or one has to introduce a second dimension concerned 
with the manner in which the government deals with the political class. This last 
solution is the only realistic way out of the problem. 
As a first and simplified approximation of these two dimensions, one can 
distinguish among four quadrants in which real-world parliamentary 
governments can be located. These are a “bare majority adversarial” quadrant, 
a “bare majority cooperative” quadrant, a “large majority adversarial” quadrant 
and a “large majority cooperative” quadrant. The first of these quadrants 
corresponds to what might be referred to as “true Westminster” parliamentary 
governments. The second corresponds to governments, such as those of 
Scandinavia, of Finland in most cases, and to an extent of Germany, in which 
the “bloc” in power does attempt (or has) to build a degree of consensual 
arrangement with the forces of the opposition. The third and the fourth 
quadrants correspond to what are usually referred to as “consociational” 
governments: power-sharing is substantial but, in one case, there is a posture 
of imposition on the part of those in power, while in the second, the mo e is at 
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least more cooperative. Belgium, pre 1992 Italy and Austria, especially after 
1986, are typically regarded as examples of the first of these two 
“consociational” types, while the Netherlands is typically regarded as 
corresponding to the second. One can therefore see that consociational 
governments are indeed part of a sub-set which has its place in the model. 
 
Figure 1 
Four Types of Parliamentary Democracies 
 
  Mode of behaviour of government 
 




Dimension 2 Majority Confrontation  Collaboration 
Composition of  
the Government Large Consociative  Consensual  
 Majority 
 
The Variables Which Account for the Position of 
Parliamentary Governments in the Two-Dimensional Space 
Lijphart does indeed refer to two dimensions in his analysis (1999, 3); but 
these are not dimensions concerned with the nature of the two types of 
government, as has just been the case. They are dimensions within which are 
located the independent variables which are regarded as accounting fr the 
position of governments in relation to the two ideal-types (nine in the earlier 
1984 version, ten in the 1999 version). These two dimensions of the 
independent variables are said to constitute respectively an “executive-parties” 
plane and a “federal-unitary” plane. These variables need to be examined as 
they do pose a number of serious problems which seem to call for adjustments 
and modifications.   
The ten variables mentioned in the 1999 volume are the following: 
"The five differences on the executive-parties dimension are as follows: 
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1. Concentration of executive power in single-party majority cabinets 
versus executive power-sharing in broad multi-party coalitions. 
2. Executive-legislative relationships in which the executive is dominant 
versus executive-legislative balance of power. 
3. Two-party versus multi-party systems. 
4. Majoritarian and disproportional electoral systems versus proportional 
representation. 
5. Pluralist interest group systems with free-fo -all competition among 
groups versus coordinated and “corporatist” interest group systems aimed at 
compromise and concertation. 
The five differences on the federal-unitary dimension are the following: 
1. Unitary and centralised government versus federal and decentralised 
government. 
2. Concentration of legislative power in a unicameral legislature versus 
division of legislative power between two equally strong but differently 
constituted houses. 
3. Flexible constitutions that can be amended by simple majorities versus 
rigid constitutions that can be changed only by extraordinary majorities. 
4. Systems in which legislatures have the final word on the 
constitutionality of their own legislation versus systems in which laws are 
subject to a judicial review of their constitutionality by supreme or constitutional 
courts. 
5. Central banks that are dependent on the executive versus independent 
central banks" (1999, 3-4). 
In the first place, serious difficulties arise from the fact that all these 
variables are presented in a dichotomous manner: the location f a given 
parliamentary system becomes often arbitrary as a result, although, admittedly, 
in the course of the volume, a determined effort is made to go beyond 
dichotomies. Difficulties remain, however. Little is done, for instance, to look at 
intermediate situations between “single-party cabinets” and “broad multi-par y 
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coalitions”: the key operational distinction being between “single-party cabinets” 
and “minimal winning cabinets” (1999, 110 and following). Some distinctions 
allow for situations which are not mutually exclusive. For instance, a 
government may be both unitary and decentralised: in practice, Lijphart is 
obliged to allocate points to countries which fall in one of five categories (1999, 
188-90). There are also unclear categorisations: is what is important from the 
point of view of legislatures that there should be only one, that there should be 
two but have equal powers, or that they should have equal powers but be 
differently constituted? The points allocated to seven categorises are clearly 
somewhat arbitrary (1999, 211-3). 
There are two further and ostensibly more serious problems. It is 
remarked that the correlation between some of the variables is high. Yet this 
may simply be that this intercorrelation is the direct result of the effect of one 
variable over the other, not an “unexpected” intercorrelation between two 
factors which , somewhat surprisingly, cam to be associated with each other. 
For instance, majoritarian electoral systems tend to reduce markedly the 
number of parties in parli ment, if the party system is nationally homogenous; 
indeed these systems result in parties obtaining absolute majorities with only a 
minority of votes. It follows that variables 1, 3, and 4 of the “executive-parties” 
dimension are so linked to each other at they constitute something close to 
being only one variable. It is therefore not surprising that they should combine 
to produce one factor. 
The other difficulty stems from the fact that no explanation is given as to 
why these variables have been chosen and not others. This defect relates 
particularly to the “federal-unitary” dimension. That dimension does correspond 
to an extent to what was termed here the “adversarial-cooperative” dimension 
in that it considers instances in which bodies other than the government are 
involved in the decision process: but no reason is given for the choices which 
are made and especially why the variables chosen are almost all of a juridical 
character. If one leaves aside the fact that the fifth variable of the first group 
analytically belongs to the second group (pluralism v. concertation), it is unclear 
why constitutional aspects are given such prominence, why central banks are 
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chosen and not other regulatory bodies and why the only structural 
characteristic of parliaments is the question of the second chamber. What is in 
reality being tested is whether there are or not a series of rather legalistic 
“checks and balances” which reduce the power of the cabinet. These variables 
may be important per se, but they do not, except very indirectly, affect the 
extent to which a government will act in a consensual manner. What they do is 
identify the existence of a number of veto points: yet it is not at all axiomatic 
that the existence of veto points will result in a consensus-oriented 
government. They may lead to stalemate or to log-r llin , as is often the case 
in the United States. A “consensual” approach to government is positive and 
genuinely open to the views and comments of others: it does not consist of and 
is not likely to stem from the existence of a series of hurdles which have to be 
overcome.  
The juridical character of many variables and the way the others tend to 
be treated result in the overall scheme being inevitably rather static. It is 
particularly difficult to introduce changes which occur, irrespective of the fact 
that the constitution is not altered, for instance, in the arrangements which the 
political class decides to enter into, either at the level of power-sharing or at 
that of the mode of behaviour of the government in relation to the political 
forces outside the government. It is therefore difficult to use the indicators 
which have been selected to assess the extent to which the character of 
Western European parliamentary systems was altered in the course of the last 
decades of the twentieth century. Yet it does seem that many of these 
governments have changed appreciably, at least on the basis of the 
examination of the way they are composed as well from some aspects of their 
behaviour, especially in relation to the two dimensions which have been 
identified here.    
II 
If these two dimensions are used as the comparative yardstick, it does 
seem that, in the last decade of the twentieth century, all Western European 
parliamentary governments have come to be organised o  the basis of “blocs”: 
they have therefore to be described as being “majoritarian” in character and to 
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have ceased, in Lijphart’s terms, to be “consensual”. Meanwhile, it also seems 
that, in some cases, the “bloc” which constitutes the government is adopting–
or may have had to adopt, to a greater extent than in the past– a “cooperative” 
rather than an “adversarial” mode. 
A Move Away from Consociationalism Towards “Bare 
Majorities” 
The Netherlands. As is well-known, especially on the basis of Lijphart's 
earlier work (1977), The Netherlands has been the classic case of 
“consociational” parliamentary government: cabinets have tended to be 
constituted on the basis of an alliance among the parties representing the 
largest “pillars” in the country, religious, lay and of the “working people”. The 
religious parties markedly declined in the second half of the twentieth century, 
the merger of the three religious parties to form the CDA in the 1970s being 
both a consequence of this decline and an attempt to stem it. From then on, 
the Christian party was central to the governments of the country for two 
decades: it became the “pivot” party, as periodic oscillations led to the Liberal 
party or the Labour party to be its main partner. There was thus a form of 
consociationalism, though it was more “successive” than “simultaneous”; but it 
was assumed that, were a truly serious situation to arise, all three parties would 
be involved. 
Meanwhile, the raison d'être for the consociational arrangement which 
dated from the period of the First World War had come to lose much of its 
strength. The Christian parties' decline was a consequence of the 
deconfessionalisation of the country, while Labour was unable to retain the 
loyal support of all its “natural” constituency, as small breakaway parties came 
into existence. The Liberal party did benefit to an extent from the losses of its 
two main rivals, but not sufficiently to enable it to become the dominant 
element. By the 1990s, the notion of “pillars” had ceased to have more than a 
historical significance. 
In such a context, what was in reality a political earthquake occurred in 
1994 when the Labour party allied with the Liberal party and the small Centre-
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left D 66 to form a government, while the CDA was rejected into the opposition, 
for the first time since World War 2. The new coalition may or may not have 
been expected to last, given the fact that it was breaking with what had been 
such a long tradition: it did last and was even reconstituted after the 1998 
general election. Not only was the CDA no longer the “pivot”, but the concept of 
“pivot” ceased to be valid: it was no longer considered axiomatic that the three 
large parties should be part of an overall “power-sharing” arrangement, whether 
“successive” or “simultaneous”. Since the 2002 spring General Election, which 
was characterised by a major defeat of the Labour Party, the CDA returned to 
power in alliance with the Liberal party and with new populist party which had 
been created by Fortijn. The populist party proved to be a difficult partner and a 
second election was called in that year which did indeed lead to a decline of the 
populist party and to a substantial recovery of the Labour party: yet that party 
did not return to form a coalition with the CDA and the government remained 
based on the centre- ight. Consensus had ceased to be the basis on which 
Dutch governments were constituted and had so long been characterised, 
although the “cooperative” type of rule on which the government had been 
based did not alter and is not likely to change, given the climate in which 
politics has traditionally been fought in the country. 
Belgium. In contrast to The Netherlands, where the monarch long played 
a part in the composition and life of the cabinet, Belgium is, with Italy, one of 
the oldest parliamentary governments of Continental Western Europe: it was 
well-established long before the end of the nineteenth century. That 
parliamentary system was based on the opposition between Conservative and 
Liberals, first, and between Christians and Liberals when the Liberal 
government became increasingly anticlerical. Thus traditional politics in the 
country was firmly based on a “majoritarian” rule of the Westminster type. 
The emergence of the Socialist party towards the end of the nineteenth 
century resulted in the emergence of a new cleavage: to prevent the 
destruction of the old party system, proportional representation was introduced 
and, at that point, three “pillars” came to dominate political life, but the old 
opposition between clericals and anticlericals did not die out altogether: even 
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after World War 2, a government led by a Socialist and composed principally 
of socialists and liberals run the country for four years, between 1950 and 1954, 
only to be replaced, after that coalition lost the election, by a single-party 
Christian Social party government. Admittedly, both before World War 1 and 
between the World Wars, the party system had become more complicated, in 
part, between the wars, by the emergence of a party whose leader was an 
admirer of fascists and nazis. Yet up to the 1960s “majoritarianism” remained a 
feature of Belgian parliamentary government. 
The situation was altered when the main issue ceased to be economic 
and religious and centred on the language-cum-community problem. The 
emergence of that issue led to demands for profound institutional changes, 
changes which could not be achieved without constitutional amendments and 
therefore without the agreement of a large majority in parliament. The three 
major parties –which meanwhile had split along language lines– had therefore 
to work together if reform was to take place, a process which ended in 1993 
only, when the new federal constitution came into force. During the intervening 
period, political arrangements started to resemble the mode which was 
characteristic of The Netherlands: specifically, the Christian parties (both 
Dutch– and French-speaking) became the combined “pivots” of the system. 
Belgium was therefore naturally regarded as having a consociational type of 
parliamentary government. 
Yet it is as if the introduction of the new constitution in 1993 was closing 
the “parenthesis” of the consociational period. Only five years later, in 1998, a 
government headed by a liberal and composed of Liberals, Socialists and 
Greens –thus replicating, almost fifty years later, the Socialist-Liberal 
government of 1950– was constituted without the Christian parties, which were 
relegated to the opposition, after having been regarded as indispensable for the 
working of the Belgian parliamentary government for a generation and that 
government handsomely won the 2003 General Election: it was reconstituted, 
this time without the Greens.. Unquestionably the formation and subsequent 
success of the non-Christian coalition does indicate that Belgium has returned 
to majoritarianism. Whether the government will practice a cooperative form of 
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parliamentary government needs to be determined, as, in the past, 
consociationalism in Belgium was appreciably more adversarial than its 
counterpart in The Netherlands. 
Austria. More than any other Western European parliamentary country, 
Austria was the country of the “grand coalition”. The nearly two decades of 
single party government between 1966 and 1983 and the small Socialist-
Liberal coalition of 1983-1986 seemed to be a mere hiatus when the 
government returned to operate on the basis of the “grand coalition” formula 
which seemed to have served the country well during the early postwar 
decades. 
There had been a number of reasons for adopting that formula. The 
desire to avoid the huge interwar tensions between the parties which had 
indirectly led to the absorption of the country into Germany in 1938 played an 
important part, together with the need to show unity in the face of occupation in 
1945, particularly in the face of Soviet occupation, as well as, once the State 
Treaty of 1955 had been signed, the need to maintain the neutrality of the 
country. The result was a form of consociationalism which, in the Austrian 
case, given the combined electoral strength of the two main parties in the 
1950s and 1960s –over 90 percent– meant indeed something approaching 
complete “consensus”. 
The single party government of the Populist party from 1966 to 1970 and 
the Socialist government led by Kreisky between 1970 and 1983 seemed to be 
a mere hiatus in that, despite the fact that party conflict was severe on 
occasion, for instance over the question of nuclear energy, much of political life 
continued to be regulated on the basis of the “proporz” principles which had 
been elaborated inthe early postwar period and which included in particular a 
complex but comprehensive “division of the spoils” among the supporters of 
the two main parties. The government came to be in the hands of one party 
only, but the rest of the political system continued to be operated on a 
consociational basis. 
In a sense, the first sign of change resulted from the experiment with the 
“small” Socialist-Liberal coalition of 1983-1986, both because this arrangement 
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meant that the Socialist party was looking for a possible alternative ally and 
because the Liberal party, hitherto considered as “beyond the pale” as a result 
of its original dubious credentials –it was regarded as the party of the “fascists”– 
had become viewed as worthy of participating in the government. A breach in 
the “proporz” system had been made: party conflict was beginning to be played 
differently. 
The experiment ended when the Liberal party seemed once more, under 
Haider, to be “unacceptable”: this led to the re-establishment of the “grand 
coalition” in 1986. Yet, by then, given the increased electoral successes of the 
Liberal party as well as given the emergence of small parties, notably the 
Greens, the support for the “grand coalition” at the polls shrank markedly while 
the “proporz” system was coming increasingly under attack. What Haider's 
Liberal party was demonstrating was not only that the coalition of the two main 
parties constituted an attempt to keep indefinite control on a large variety of 
spoils but also that a substantial proportion of the population was opposed to 
the very idea of consociationalism as the basis of political life. 
The result of the 1999 election was so favourable to the Liberals that it 
became impossible for the two traditional parties to continue on the basis of the 
classical formula. The formation of a Populist-Liberal government led to an 
outcry in many quarters, both in and outside Austria; it may or may not have 
been “politically correct” to allow Haider's party a share in the government. 
What the formation of that government did achieve, however, was to establish 
for the first time since 1945 the existence of a “bloc” system: it therefore 
marked the end of consociational rule, a development which was confirmed in 
2002-3, when the government was based once again on the Populist and 
Liberal parties only. Whether Austrian majoritarianism will be adversarial or 
cooperative has to be determined gradually: Austrian consociationalism was 
indeed adversarial in that, under the “grand coalition” formula, the Liberal party 
was never regarded as constituting a “normal” party. With the main opposition 
being constituted by the Socialist party, it may well be that the governmental 
mode of behaviour will be less adversarial, but the presence of the Liberal 
party in that government is unlikely to constitute a factor of cooperation. 
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Italy. Although the Italian parliamentary system was almost as old as that 
of Belgium, its development in the nineteenth century was markedly less 
structured. The party system was fluid and practices such as trasformismo 
made it extremely common for elected representatives to switch from the 
opposition to the government side. A number of political leaders, Depretis and 
Giolitti in particular, were masters at the manipulation of parliament in the years 
preceding World War 1. The system ended brutally a few years after the end of 
the conflict, as the traditional political class proved unable to deal with a 
marked frustration in many quarters about the peace settlement and with a 
near-revolutionary situation in many industrial areas. The parliamentary system 
had few real supporters when Mussolini destroyed it. 
The re-establishment of parliamentary government two decades later in 
the aftermath of defeat took place in a climate of profound political and social 
divisions: these were restrained only as a result of the determination of all the 
political leaders and of the Communist leaders in particular, the latter having 
probably realised that the Western allies and especially the Americans would 
not allow Italy to be taken over by the Communist party. A mode of political 
behaviour somewhat reminiscent of the Dutch formula at the time of World 
War I came to emerge as a result. What could be regarded as the “pillars” in 
Italian society, especially the two main ones, catholi  and communist, were 
made by their leaders to accept to “live together”: a “broad-based” 
consociationalism' had been established. 
That “broad-based” consociationalism was to be quickly shattered by the 
emergence of the cold war, however, and only some of its elements remained 
and were able to re-surface temporarily in the wake of the waves of right-win  
and even more left-wing terrorism which shook the country thirty years later, in 
the mid and late seventies. In between, a “limited” form of consociationalism 
developed, its elements being constituted by the Christian democrats, by far 
the largest component, and by a number of small parties, Republicans and 
Social democrats in particular, as well as eventually by the somewhat larger 
Socialist party. The Christian democrats did not have a majority; their electoral 
strength was indeed gradually declining: but, as the Communist party could not 
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be an alternative partner for the Christian democrats if Italy was to remain part 
of the Western alliance, the group of the parties which shared power had to 
remain broadly speaking the same and elections could not modify 
fundamentally the political equilibrium. “Limited” consociationalism was 
therefore a necessity; it was an adversarial form of consociationalism, at least 
until the late 1970s when the “historic compromise” was struck with the 
Communist party.  
Although “broad-based” consociationalism was then able to make a 
comeback, this was not for long, as, in a sense in a somewhat similar manner 
to what was occurring in Austria at about the same time, the “spirit” of the 
Italian political system began to be altered by the reassertion by the Socialist 
party of its autonomy under Craxi, a reassertion which was facilitated by the 
formation of the first governments not led by a Christian democrat in the early 
1980s. Craxi succeeded in rendering credible the view that, as Mitterrand had 
done in France a few years earlier, the Socialist party could overcome the 
Communist party and, at that point, become a political force able to chal nge 
the Christian democrats. 
Although this scenario was not to succeed, the seeds of majoritarianism 
has been sown: when the old party system collapsed in 1992, it became 
increasingly accepted by the political class that one of the reasons for the 
ineffectiveness and corruption inherent in that system was consociationalism. 
That view was propounded in a strident manner by the leader of the separatist 
Northern League; it was strongly put forward by Berlusconi, who had founded 
Forza Italia on the ruins of the Christian democrats, the Socialists and a 
number of small parties; it was adopted by many leaders of the Centre-l ft a d 
Left, whether ex-Communists having reconverted themselves into the Party of 
the Democratic Left or ex-Christian democrats. 
The 1994 general election did indeed for the first time being about a sharp 
division between what was officially described as two “poles”. Berlusconi won, 
but only with the help of the Northern League which proceeded to defect six 
months later. Despite various palinodies which resembled the trasformismo of 
the past, the 1996 and 2001 general elections reinforced the move towards a 
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“two-bloc” situation: more strongly than the political class of The Netherlands, 
Belgium or Austria, the Italian political class had turned to “majoritarianism”, a 
majoritarianism which seemed likely to remain adversarial, in part because of 
the controversial figure of Berlusconi but also in part because of the communist 
past of many leaders of the Centre-left alliance. 
By the beginni g of the twenty-first century, all the Western European 
parliamentary governments had thus moved away from power-sharing and had 
come to adopt the politics of “blocs”, on the understanding that general 
elections would be the mechanism which would decide wh ch of the “blocs” 
would be in power for the duration of the subsequent parliament. If power-
sharing thus appears to have been abandoned, does it also mean that the 
move towards consensus politics is also on the way? 
An Uncertain Move Away From Adversarial Politics and 
Towards Cooperation 
We noted that the move away from consociationalism and towards 
majoritarianism which has taken place among Western European 
parliamentary systems at the end of the twentieth century does not appear to 
be necessarily linked to a move towards greater cooperation. Moreover, it 
might seem highly exaggerated, if not plainly wrong, to suggest that a move 
towards cooperation should be taking place among the three Western 
European parliamentary systems which have traditionally been majoritarian, 
Britain, Ireland and France, as well as among the three democracies of 
Southern Europe which emerged from authoritarian rule in the 1970s, Portugal, 
Spain and Greece. To take only one example, Thatcher's Britain in the 1980s 
was markedly more adversarial than Macmillan's Britain in the early 1960s. 
Yet there are both a general and a highly specific reason which appear to 
indicate that a move towards cooperation is in the offing, both in these six 
countries and in the “new” majoritarian countries. The general reason has to do 
with the current characteristics of “advanced democracies”. Somewhat 
paradoxically, at the same time as the “new” “robust” form of conservatism 
took roots in Britain and elsewhere, the move towards the “end of ideology” 
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was also strengthening: what Downs had predicted in 1957 and Kirchheimer 
(1966) had concretely noticed seemed to be occurring. Elections may have 
been based on strong conflicts, but these conflicts were no longer about the 
nature of the overall social system. Indeed, as the conservative wave made its 
way in the course of the late 1980s and the early 1990s, it seemed losing some 
of its strength and its supporters seemed losing some of their loyalty to the 
basic principles which the ideology aimed at implementing. Meanwhile, a series 
of “cross-bloc” conflicts, somewhat technical in character, in particular 
problems relating to the environment and to “globalisation” and its range of 
effects seem to be taking precedence over the more traditional topics of socio-
economic divisions. It may not be that an era of “good feelings” is emerging 
among the “blocs”; it is seemingly no longer evident, however, that, as in the 
1980s, political conflicts in Western European countries are about the long-
term goals which the conservative and socialist “blocs” may have once 
believed in. In the opening years of the twenty-first century, they seem to be 
about the way in which the “blocs” are able to manage their society, to render it 
economically more efficient while maintaining the fundamental features of the 
traditional features of “social justice”. 
Alongside what is a general move in “advanced political systems” in the 
direction of common –or at least less distinct– goals, developments more 
specific to Western Europe force greater cooperation between governments 
and the parts of the political class which do not belong to the governmental 
“bloc”. Such a trend is clearly the consequence of the existence of the 
European Union. As Switzerland, the European Union is a consociational body 
in which cooperation and indeed consensus are not just a fact but a necessity: 
countries as diverse as those which compose Western Europe –without 
mentioning those of Eastern Europe– could not be expected to forge a Union 
without, as Switzerland has done a d does continues to do, being “constrained” 
to function on a cooperative basis. 
Yet a direct consequence of having to cooperate at the level of the Union 
is to have to cooperate at the national level as well: countries cannot present 
“their” case for a given policy in Brussels unless they are relatively united 
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internally. The government of the day has therefore to search periodically for 
proposals likely to be acceptable to, even if not formally accepted by, at least 
the most important fraction of the opposition. As a matter of fact, both the 
movement towards majoritarianism and the movement towards cooperation 
are in large part the consequence of the membership of the European Union. 
Majoritarianism is essential for the governments of the member-States as it 
enables these governments to make their case more forcefully since it 
provides the basis for strong leadership recognised as such beyond the borders 
of the country concerned. Cooperation within the country is also essential as it 
enables each government to make clear that the other “bloc”, the one which is 
in the opposition, were it to come to power, would adopt the same policy stand. 
This is institutionally manifest in the French case, where, especially since the 
late 1990s, “cohabitation” has made a strong mark on the approach of the 
country to the European Union as well as internally in relation to a number of 
key policies: but this is also the case in the other member-States, albeit in a 
less structured manner.  
The long-term tendency of Western European parliamentary 
governments may therefore be in the direction of “cooperative” 
“majoritarianism”. The move towards majoritarianism at the end of the 
twentieth century is undeniable: the only question is how quickly it will become 
fully established. It has taken place, though in a more or less “deliberate” 
manner, in all four countries in which consociationalism prevailed throughout 
all, most or at least much of the post World War 2 period. The existence of the 
European Union suggests that the move will continue, as it gives governments 
and their leaders the opportunity to see their authority being better recognised. 
The trend towards greater cooperation between government and 
opposition is less marked. Yet there is already a decline in the extent to which 
adversarial politics prevails in the “majoritarian” countries in comparison with 
the 1980s and early 1990s. The membership of the European Union can only 
have the effect of reducing hitherto strongly-felt divisions within the individual 
States and thus lead the government of each country to discuss with the 
opposition in a meaningful manner many of its key proposals. This may not 
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result, in the short-term at least, in the kind of cooperation with non-
governmental forces which characterises politics in Sweden or in Denmark. 
This does suggest, however, that a significant move will take place in that 
direction, the overall consequence being that, in terms of the manner in which 
parliamentary government operates concretely within the member-States, 
practices will be more similar than they were at any time among the countries 
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